U.S.-Russia Strategic Nuclear Stability & Cooperative Missile Defenses
Instructor & Client: Dr. Sankaran
Ideal for: Students exploring careers in national security, nuclear and emerging weapon systems, and arms control.
Travel: Travel to George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and George W. Bush Presidential Library
MGPS Seats: 12
Skills: Strong writing skills; interest in archival research & case study analysis
Since the end of the Cold War, one issue — the American pursuit of limited national missile defenses — has persistently animated U.S.-Russia dialogue on nuclear stability and arms control.
Russia has repeatedly argued that such a missile defense system can be quickly expanded and directed against it, thereby compromising nuclear stability between the U.S. and Russia. President Vladimir Putin, for instance, recently claimed American national missile defenses could lead to the "complete devaluation of Russia's nuclear" deterrence forces. President Putin outlined the development of several new strategic nuclear weapon systems with the primary goal of evading and defeating U.S. missile defenses. These nuclear arms modernization efforts are triggering concerns in the United States. These concerns are weakening support for sustaining the New START Treaty and arms control more generally.
Arriving at a mutually acceptable arrangement that permits legitimate limited defenses while conveying reassurance to Russia will be a prerequisite for future arms control endeavors. Cooperative missile defenses provide a potent avenue for conveying reassurance. We will explore two past attempts at cooperative missile defenses to learn lessons for similar future efforts.
Case Study 1: George H. W. Bush Administration
At a June 1992 summit, under President Yeltsin and President Bush's leadership, "senior high-level groups" were established to discuss a cooperative Global Protection System (GPS) against missiles. Stephen Hadley, President Bush's assistant secretary of defense, notes the administration considered ways to share early-warning information, cooperatively developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies, and establishing a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements. Russian experts view "rapid progress made in those talks" as the most significant effort to date on achieving cooperative missile defense. If correct, why do Russian experts view this iteration as especially productive? What were the cooperative measures discussed with Russia? How did Russia receive it? How did the U.S. domestic political constraints narrow the range of options outlined by Stephen Hadley?
Case Study 2: George W. Bush Administration
In June 2000, an agreement was signed to pursue the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). It was meant to be a US-Russia jointly operated center to exchange processed, unclassified early warning information and notification of future missile and space launches. The George W. Bush administration inherited the JDEC, but progress stalled, ostensibly over tax liabilities. How did the JDEC disagreement evolve over the term of the Bush administration? What internal debates occurred within the Bush administration on resolving disputes in establishing the JDEC? How did Russia react? What lessons does the failure of the JDEC offer for future attempts to institute a jointly operated early warning center?
Students will explore these two cases through extensive archival research as part of the Professional Research Project (PRP). They will then devise a policymaking agenda to achieve cooperative missile defenses in the future.